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SPECIFICATION DECK · NIST FIPS 203 / 204 / 205PUBLISHED 13 AUG 2024 · 8 PARAMETER SETS

NIST FIPS 203, 204 & 205 Post-Quantum Algorithm Reference

On 13 August 2024, NIST published the first three finalised federal post-quantum cryptographic standards. Use the byte-budget matrix below to size TLS 1.3 handshake buffers, X.509 certificate chains, and HSM storage slots.

FIPS 203
ML-KEM (Key Encap)
FIPS 204
ML-DSA (Lattice Sig)
FIPS 205
SLH-DSA (Hash Sig)
Abstract geometric lattice model illustrating post-quantum key encapsulation math

Parameter Sets, Security Categories & Wire Byte Sizes

StandardParameter SetNIST Security LevelPublic KeyCiphertext / SignaturePrimary Production Role
FIPS 203ML-KEM-512Category 1 (AES-128 eq.)800 B768 BConstrained IoT key encapsulation
FIPS 203ML-KEM-768Category 3 (AES-192 eq.)1,184 B1,088 BDefault commercial TLS 1.3 hybrid (X25519MLKEM768) & OpenSSH 9.9+
FIPS 203ML-KEM-1024Category 5 (AES-256 eq.)1,568 B1,568 BNSA CNSA 2.0 National Security Systems & sovereign secrets
FIPS 204ML-DSA-44Category 21,312 B2,420 BHigh-throughput TLS/mTLS leaf authentication
FIPS 204ML-DSA-65Category 31,952 B3,309 BGeneral enterprise X.509 certificates & document signing
FIPS 204ML-DSA-87Category 52,592 B4,627 BNSA CNSA 2.0 PKI roots, OS packages, and high-assurance code signing
FIPS 205SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sCategory 1 (Stateless Hash)32 B7,856 BLong-lived root CAs and firmware verification independent of lattice assumptions
FIPS 205SLH-DSA-SHA2-256fCategory 5 (Stateless Hash)64 B49,856 BFast offline artifact signing where signature size is non-critical

Technical Questions Answered

Why deploy X25519MLKEM768 for key exchange before rotating RSA/ECDSA TLS certificates to ML-DSA?+

Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks target confidentiality: an adversary recording TLS sessions today can decrypt them later if the key exchange was classical X25519. Authentication signatures only need to resist forgery at the moment of the handshake, whereas ML-DSA certificate chains add 7 KB to 15 KB to handshake payloads and require CA root program updates.

Why use a hybrid group (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) instead of standalone ML-KEM-768?+

Combining battle-tested elliptic-curve X25519 with lattice-based ML-KEM-768 guarantees that session confidentiality remains at least as strong as classical TLS 1.3 even if an unexpected flaw were ever found in module-lattice cryptography, while immediately blocking quantum Shor decryption.

Are AES-256 and SHA-384 broken by a quantum computer?+

No. Shor’s algorithm breaks public-key systems based on integer factorisation (RSA) and discrete logarithms (Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, ECDSA). Grover’s algorithm provides at most a quadratic speedup against symmetric ciphers, meaning AES-256 and SHA-384 retain high post-quantum security.

What did NIST rename Kyber, Dilithium, and SPHINCS+ to in the final August 2024 standards?+

In the final August 2024 publications, CRYSTALS-Kyber was standardised as ML-KEM (FIPS 203), CRYSTALS-Dilithium became ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SPHINCS+ became SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), with minor domain-separation and seed-handling updates incompatible with pre-standard drafts.

Reviewed by Callum Reid, Principal Infrastructure & Cryptography Editor

Reviews post-quantum transport standards and PKI specifications.

Last reviewed:

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